The Campaigns of Napoleon

Highlights

Page 542

The nationalistic enthusiasm of the French armies spread the gospel little by little throughout Germany and Italy, and although the forces of reaction managed to postpone their total eclipse for almost half a century, the spirit of nationalism burned on and in the end proved one of Napoleon’s doughtiest opponents.

Page 594

Thirdly, and most detrimentally of all, his increasing obsession with the need to spread the Continental System and perfect its working played no insignificant part in inducing Napoleon to make his two cardinal errors of military and political judgment: the decision to invade Portugal and Spain in 1807–08 and the decision to attack Russia in 1812.

Page 674

He enumerated three basic requirements for a successful general: concentration of force, activity and a firm resolve to perish gloriously.

Page 675

Death is nothing, but to live defeated is to die every day.”

Page 689

“In war, men are nothing; one man is everything,”

Page 689

“Better one bad general than two good ones.”

Page 693

Napoleon’s genius—that utterly indefinable quality which enabled him to make the utmost use of the these great powers and gifts. “An infinite capacity for taking pains”

Page 701

“Ambition is the main driving force in man,” he once wrote. “A man expends his abilities as long as he hopes to rise; but when he has reached the highest summit he only asks for rest.”

Page 309

He had hit upon the safe solution to the quandary facing every revolutionary general by deciding always to ask the Députés-en-Mission for their suggestions concerning operations and then acting upon them. That way he felt he could at least keep his head on his shoulders.

Page 029

on the evening of the 23rd Colli asked for an armistice. Bonaparte’s reaction to this was to push forward even faster.

Page 877

Bonaparte, on the other hand, undoubtedly did his utmost to keep the enemy under attack, and lost very few opportunities of doing so, even at the cost of irreplaceable casualties and the growing exhaustion of his men.

Page 879

One of the basic maxims of Napoleon stresses the all-importance of achieving maximum concentration of forces at the right place and time, in other words on the battlefield. Another striking feature of the First Italian Campaign is the way Bonaparte always contrived to bring the greatest possible number of his available men onto the field.

Page 922

General William Tecumseh Sherman—not the gentlest or mildest of soldiers during the American Civil War—said in a speech at Columbus, Ohio: “There is many a boy here today who looks on war as all glory, but boys, it is all hell.”

Page 926

War makes rattling good history; but Peace is poor reading.”

Page 998

Gradually the ideas from different sources began to coalesce and amalgamate as Bonaparte’s mathematical mind forged through the inessential to grasp the kernel of truth. And little by little the underlying concepts of war which were to govern the next twenty-seven years of his life began to emerge. It was no easy discipline that the young officer set himself. “In military, public or administrative affairs,” he wrote years later, “there is a need for deep thought as well as deep analysis, and also for an ability to concentrate on subjects for a long time without fatigue.”7

Page 164

To speak of Napoleon’s “principles of war” is to court misunderstanding, because the word “principle” conjures up in the mind the idea of a fundamental law governing conduct. The most outstanding feature of Napoleonic warfare is its limitless variation and flexibility.

Page 344

In this way Napoleon fused battle with maneuver, and thus made possibly his greatest contribution to the art of war. All of his strategic plans have a decisive battle in mind, and every move made by his units is geared to a possible battle situation. Unlike his eighteenth-century forebears, who rigidly distinguished between maneuvering and giving battle, adopting different formations for each activity, Napoleon fused marching, fighting and pursuing into one continuous process.

Page 394

“The sight of a battlefield, after the fight, is enough to inspire princes with a love of peace and a horror of war,”

Page 194

“The Directory was dominated by its own weakness; in order to exist it needed a perpetual state of war just as other governments need peace.”

Note: Just like the Pakistani army

Page 922

The Emperor also tended to appoint only second-rate men to the key ministries—Fouché and Talleyrand excepted—and for many years the amenable Maret filled the key post of secretary of state. Such measures kept the executive to heel, but as a general rule efficiency was maintained and improved.

Page 037

To guarantee the continuation of Napoleonic government, it appeared necessary to ensure that the succession should go to a member of the Bonaparte family de jure in order to discourage further plotters against the regime.

Page 042

Thus it was that on December 2, 1804, Napoleon was crowned Emperor of the French, though to the end of his days he remained plain General Bonaparte to his foreign enemies. “Joseph, if only our father could see us now!”11 he murmured as he ascended the steps of the throne. As Robespierre had prophesied would happen when he opposed the original declaration of war in 1792, a more absolute monarch than any known in France’s history hitherto had emerged from the years of struggle, but not everything that the Revolution stood for had perished. The best principles of equality of opportunity and fraternité were incorporated in the new order, and the revolutionary land settlement remained sacrosanct, but only at the price of the destruction of political liberty. Nevertheless, Napoleon Bonaparte had brought his adopted country a period of peace, albeit very shortlived, during which he established firm government and national security by starting the re-ordering of every aspect of civil life. For these gifts he received the genuine gratitude of the mass of the population. Order, efficiency and prosperity seemed worth the price of tyranny—at least in the early years. A purely military dictatorship could hardly have survived as long.

Page 135

Three days after the coronation in December, another spectacular ceremony was held, in Paris this time, when the assembled colonels of the French army received their eagle standards from the hands of the Emperor on the Champ-de-Mars.

Note: Eagle standards on the campus martius

Page 140

Not all the reviews of the armed forces were so successful as these. On July 20, 1804, for instance, there occurred the notorious and revealing incident when Napoleon overrode the advice of his admirals and ordered the Boulogne naval flotillas to pass in review before him in spite of the advent of an onshore gale. Admiral Bruix was dismissed from the service and exiled to Holland on the spot for remonstrating, and a cowed Vice Admiral Magon issued the necessary orders. The result was predictable; “More than 20 gun sloops filled with soldiers and sailors were flung ashore, the unfortunate occupants crying out for aid which none could afford them as they battled against the furious waves.”13 More than 2,000 men were drowned as the Emperor prowled up and down the beach with beetling brows, seemingly totally unmindful of the disaster he had needlessly caused. Megalomanic tendencies were not far below the surface of Napoleon’s personality.

Note: He didn’t care that much about his men dying. And honestly, no one but a sociopath could be an effective general.

Page 202

Why had France’s relations with the great continental powers deteriorated so abruptly? The answer lies partly in British diplomatic activity and partly in unwise though often deliberate provocations on the part of France. For several years, Imperial Russia had been subjected to strong British diplomatic and economic pressure. The young Tsar Alexander I (reigned 1801–25) was in many ways the very antithesis of “Mad Tsar Paul,” his father. In the last years of his reign, Paul had become increasingly bewitched by Bonaparte’s achievements (with dire results for Pitt’s Second Coalition), and few men of affairs were surprised when his son, after a brief period of enchantment with the First Consul’s abilities, adopted a hostile policy toward France. Until the spring of 1803, however, these Francophobic tendencies were held in check by Russia’s other traditional interests which tended to clash with British policy. Alexander was a typical Romanov in his territorial ambitions, and he cast increasingly covetous eyes on the weak Baltic states, the growing chaos of the Turkish empire, on the Mediterranean world in general and the island of Malta in particular. Whitehall, on the other hand, was largely dependent on the Baltic for supplies of timber, tar, hemp and other vital supplies for the Royal Navy, and had no wish to find these raw materials exclusively under Russian control. As far as Turkey was concerned, it was British policy to support “the Sick Man of Europe” and exclude other power groupings from the Levant. Vital British trading interests were also involved in the Mediterranean, and British merchants had little desire for Russian competition in the area; hence London’s unwillingness to part with Malta for all the complicated terms of Amiens, which decreed that the island should be restored under an international guarantee to the Knights of St. John, whose Grand Master, by one of those historical ironies, happened to be the Tsar of all the Russias. Understandably, therefore, it took considerable time for British and Russian diplomats to overcome their mutual suspicions, but it soon became evident that Napoleon would have to be cut down to size. Following the Peace of Lunéville, France and Russia had become regarded as coexecutors of the German territorial adjustments, but the French Government lost no time in imposing its own settlement on the area without troubling to consult its partner. Furthermore, in his dealings with Italy, the First Consul deliberately flouted Holy Russia’s declared interests in the region, and the list of French annexations in the Po valley appeared to be deliberate insults flung in Russia’s teeth. Colonel Sébastiani’s mission to the Levant appeared to presage a French occupation of the Morea or Montenegro, and in response the “Little Father” deemed it necessary to seize Corfu. The murder of the Duke of Enghien was the final provocation. Alexander prided himself as the doyen of European royalty, and the execution of the…

Note: Invaluable context for the beginning of War and Peace. In that book characters simply say the time has come to cut the Consul down to size.

Page 230

Austria had even more justification for distrust and hatred of France. There were two lost wars and two unfavorable peace treaties to be avenged, and the victor had lost no time in exacting the maximum advantage from his position along the Rhine and in North Italy to the detriment of Austrian interests. Between 1801 and 1803 the First Consul enforced a reconstruction of Germany which was very unfavorable to Austria; the mass of small principalities and powers that made up the bulk of the Holy Roman Empire were ruthlessly reduced from 350 to a mere 39, and France supplanted Austria as the protector of these remaining Rhineland princes; the Peace of Leoben had guaranteed territorial compensation from the sequestrated ecclesiastical states for the dispossessed landowners on the west bank of the Rhine, but all that Austria received in return for her losses in the area were two minor Bishoprics while her rivals, Bavaria and Prussia, waxed fatter than ever before. Worse was to follow; the French “Act of Mediation” in Switzerland was a breach of the Lunéville agreements and posed a strategic threat to Austrian security by driving a deep wedge between her remaining German and Italian spheres of influence. More threatening still was French acquisitiveness in Italy. The annexation of Piedmont and Elba was hard enough to swallow, and the French occupation of Naples (1803) was particularly painful as the Queen was the Emperor of Austria’s mother-in-law. But the final blow to Austrian Hapsburg pride was Napoleon’s royal visit to Italy in May 1805, culminating in his brazen crowning of himself as King of Italy, placing the ancient Iron Crown of Lombardy atop his Imperial Crown to signify the union of France and Italy in a splendid ceremony held in the Duomo at Milan. Total exclusion from influence in North Italy was utterly inacceptable to the Hapsburgs, and from that moment a renewal of hostilities became practically certain. Pitt’s agents had been fighting an uphill struggle against the wily Austrian statesman Metternich for several years, and even in January 1804, the Emperor Francis had been pleased to declare that “France has done nothing to me.” His tone was very different seventeen months later, however, for by that time Francis had swung away from the pacifist policies of the Archduke Charles, who advocated a strategy of inaction which would allow Napoleon to become inextricably involved in a life-and-death struggle with the British people following the French crossing of the Channel. Instead the Emperor now turned to listen to his Francophobe minister Wratislaw and his Quartermaster-General, Mack, who had “imbibed the true essence of the French national spirit” and preached that “in war the object is to beat the enemy, not merely to avoid being beaten.”17 General Mack was confident that Austria would emerge triumphant from a new war, and his enthusiasm swayed the Emperor as decidedly as the Archduke’s pessimism now repelled him. In consequence, on…

Page 261

If French provocations are largely to blame for the distinctly unfavorable situation facing her in late 1805, one diplomatic achievement must be credited to Talleyrand. By clever wiles, the ex-Bishop of Autun persuaded Prussia to abstain from immediate participation in the impending European struggle. In spite of his friendly relationship with the Tsar and the strong pro-Russian proclivities of his dynamic and beautiful Queen, Frederick William III could not bring himself to ignore the bribe of the free gift of Hanover dangled before him by Talleyrand, while the proximity of Bernadotte’s corps to Prussian…

Note: Someone in War and Peace (I think Prince Andrei) said the Tsar hoped to threaten the Prussians with his army and force them out of neutrality.

Page 289

However, one basic principle of the greatest significance emerged during this period, that of centralization of command and organization. The old “front” armies (Carnot, it will be remembered, had created no less than thirteen) were abolished; henceforward there would be only a single French army, with its main strength concentrated against the most important target and detachments detailed to contain the enemy on other sectors as necessary. As Napoleon wrote, “In systems of war, as in sieges, it is necessary to concentrate all fire on the same point.”

Page 339

There was, therefore, no dearth of experienced officer material in La Grande Armée of 1805; Napoleon found himself served by good executives—men of intelligence who would nevertheless obey his orders blindly without question and execute their duty in the bravest and most determined manner imaginable.

Page 371

There was no doubt that the Guardsmen were Napoleon’s “favorite children”; they provided him with a strong reserve of élite troops always at his immediate disposal, ready to be sent into action at the decisive point and place. Until 1813, however, he proved extremely chary of committing them at all, being extremely unwilling to see his cherished protégés—most especially the Old Guard—exposed to cannon shot and musket balls. This hesitation to make full use of the Guard earned Napoleon considerable criticism from both contemporary and subsequent commentators, but he was probably justified in keeping something “up his sleeve” on at least the majority of occasions. The Guard also provided the Emperor with a standard for the rest of the army to emulate; as entry to its sacred ranks was open to any deserving soldier, it served as an incentive for loyal and valorous service. However, the creation of a corps d’élite had at least one bad effect on the army: the ceaseless draining-off of the best soldiers from the line regiments and squadrons to fill the ranks of the Guard undoubtedly weakened the value and fighting capabilities of the original parent units, and it can be argued that the expansion of the Imperial Guard was both unnecessary and wasteful—unnecessary in that the Guard rarely swung the fortunes of battle decisively by direct action (although none contend the moral value of its presence in reserve); wasteful in the way it absorbed the talent of the entire army and removed the most outstanding troops from the ordinary units where their good example might have led to greater emulation on the part of their comrades.

Note: I wonder what he himself thought. Would he have kept it smaller if he could have had a do-over?

Page 397

Regimental artillery had been provisionally discontinued by Napoleon after the Peace of Amiens on the grounds that the standard six-pounders were too heavy to accompany infantry in the field without imposing a curb on their mobility. As General Lespinasse wrote in 1800: “If you want to prevent your troops maneuvering, embarrass them with guns… . A line of infantry supported by good, properly established batteries, retains its order of battle better.”19 However, the gradual deterioration in the quality of his infantry as more and more veterans dropped out, to be replaced by increasing numbers of raw conscripts or foreign troops, induced Napoleon to revert to the old system. Thus in 1809–10, a company of artillery (four four-pounders) was provisionally attached to each infantry regiment, and the following year the practice was confirmed. “The more inferior the quality of a body of troops,” the Emperor wrote in 1809, “the more artillery it requires.”20 In 1813 the practice was again abolished, this time on account of the losses of horses and metal incurred during the Russian Campaign.

Page 528

Most of the system’s failures were experienced when fighting Wellington; he had discovered the perfect countertactic to the French method. By keeping the bulk of his men concealed behind reverse slopes, he not only protected them from the worst attentions of the French artillery and skirmishers (he also habitually pushed swarms of light infantry onto the forward slopes to keep the latter at bay), but also upset the calculations of the officers commanding the French attacking columns. Unable to locate the exact position of their adversaries, they tended to retain their troops in column until they reached the crest, and then it was too late; for, just below the top of the ridge “silent and impressive, with ported arms, loomed a long red wall,” and before the French could deploy or charge, raking vollies—often directed from three sides at once—would obliterate the head of the column and send the survivors reeling back along their tracks or at least halt them in stupefied confusion.23 This is what happened to some units of the Imperial Guard in the final phase at Waterloo: the famous grenadiers, after advancing along an incorrect line of approach, came upon Wellington’s waiting battalions before they expected to do so, and although they immediately attempted to deploy they received such a riddling fire from three sides that they proved incapable of completing the evolution, and were soon decimated and sent back in headlong retreat. Nevertheless, the fact that the system could be countered should not be allowed to disguise the fact that it brought the French ten years of almost unbroken victory on the field of battle. The fluidity, aggressiveness, élan and mobility of the French infantry proved too much for a succession of Austrian, Prussian, Spanish, Russian and Neapolitan armies. Properly applied, it held the secret of tactical success against opponents committed to rigid concepts of linear tactics; only when improperly executed—or when faced by the tactical genius of Wellington and the proverbial coolness of his British troops—did the system fail and lead to disaster.

Page 547

“Cavalry is useful before, during and after the battle,”24 he wrote on one occasion. “General Lloyd asks what is the use of large amounts of cavalry. I say that it is impossible to fight anything but a defensive war, based on field fortification and natural obstacles, unless one has practically achieved parity with the enemy cavalry; for if you lose a battle, your army will be lost.”25 He was also quite clear about the qualities required by a successful mounted arm: “Cavalry needs audacity and practice; above all it must not be dominated by the spirit of conservatism or avarice.”26 He saw that success could only be achieved through a combination of speed, shock, good order, carefully maintained formations and the correct use of reserves; but of all these requirements he placed discipline first.

Note: Something that game of thrones writers don’t understand

Page 599

Once the battle was over, they either covered the retreat or conducted the pursuit à l’outrance, preventing the shattered enemy formations from regrouping and recovering their morale, exploiting the success to the uttermost. “After Jena,” Napoleon remarked, “the light cavalry capitalized the victory all on its own,” driving the Prussians all the way to the Baltic and capturing fortresses and strong cities as well as thousands of stragglers. “Without cavalry, battles are without result”27 was his conclusion at St. Helena.

Note: Game of Thrones again.

Page 626

Napoleon and his cavalry leaders, most especially Murat, Lasalle and Grouchy, transformed the French mounted arm from a laughing-stock into a very redoubtable weapon. As a screening force the light cavalry never surpassed its achievement in concealing the Grande Armée’s rapid march from the Rhine to the Danube in 1805; its battle quality steadily improved from 1806 onward as large numbers of superior Allied horses fell into French hands alongside the other trophies of war. The heavy cavalry probably saw its greatest hour at Eylau in 1807; in pursuit, the follow-up after Jena forms an accepted historical masterpiece.

Page 892

Bourienne was the chief private secretary from 1796 to 1802, but in the end he was dismissed from the Household for peculation and larceny. “He was a thief to the extent of taking a box of diamonds from a mantlepiece,”37 recalled the Emperor at St. Helena, and while Napoleon was generally tolerant of personal peccadillos as long as a man served him well, in the end he was forced to take notice of the irregularities of his Brienne schoolfellow and remove him from his personal staff.

Note: Kleptomaniac probably. Imagine jeopardising such a job because you can’t stop stealing.

Page 922

Such, then, was the regular establishment and organization of the Maison. Of course, its composition varied enormously at different times; sometimes ministers of state would be in direct attendance, at others different specialist officers; but it was indubitably the source of operational planning, the very “power house” of the Grande Armée. However, there was only one master—or indispensable member—of the entire Maison: Napoleon himself, the tireless mastermind and brilliant strategist. Everybody else helped but none decided or initiated. In this rigid centralization of power into a single person lay at once the strength and the weakness of the Household, of the entire staff organization, of the French Empire itself.

Page 955

As a whole, the staff of the Grande Armée was not really a very impressive organization save only for size. Its organization was defective and unnecessarily complex; there was excessive duplication of function leading to inevitable mistakes, oversights and omissions; above all it was relegated to a minor administrative role compared to modern staffs, and its personnel were permitted no initiative. The Emperor once snapped “The General Staff is organized in such a manner that nothing is foreseen,” but he was responsible for its creation. One sometimes gets the impression that at a pinch Napoleon could have managed very well without such an extensive and complex staff. At best it only relieved him of mechanical duties; at worst it misrepresented his orders and caused ruinous blunders. All in all French staff work comprised a weak link in the French military machine, and no small part of Napoleon’s cataclysm can be laid at its door.

Note: This guy with electrical or radio communication would have been insane.

Page 973

The routine business of the day completed for the time being, the Emperor would call for his horse and set off accompanied by his “little headquarters” to inspect some unit or visit a corps headquarters. He was firmly convinced of the importance of a commander in chief seeing and being seen.

Page 008

Relaxation was rare, but sometimes the Emperor would play an uproarious game of pontoon or whist, cheating like mad and consequently always emerging the winner. Even Emperors and geniuses have their foibles.

Page 076

The Tsar had promised that Kutusov should arrive on Bavarian soil by October 20 with 35,000 troops, closely followed by Buxhowden’s army (40,000). Meanwhile, a third Russian army, some 20,000 strong, under the command of Marshal Bennigsen, would move on Franconia by way of Bohemia, charged with the duty of keeping a wary eye on recalcitrant Prussia to the north.

Note: Tolstoy and Chandler disagree on the Tsars policy towards Prussia. Tolstoy said he wanted to pressure the Prussians to join.

Page 082

experiences of 1796 and 1800, were basing their whole strategy on the assumption that Napoleon would inevitably make his main effort in the Italian theater once more, although the present siting of the French army along the Channel coast should have ruled out such an assessment. A second error was the inexcusable failure of the Austrian staff to make proper allowance for the ten days’ difference between their calendar and that of the Russians (who still calculated dates after the ancient Julian system). In the event, therefore, Kutusov could hardly arrive on the River Inn on the scheduled Austrian date, and this miscalculation was to ruin the balance of the entire Allied scheme.I In any case, the Austrians were planning to enter active operations prematurely. In the third place, the Austrian army in the Tyrol was unnecessarily large for a purely liaison role, and constituted a great waste of good troops who might have been far better employed in mounting diversionary attacks against Switzerland. A further blatant weakness in the Allied arrangements lay in the defective chains of high command; on the Russian side, Kutusov was instructed by his master, the Tsar, to obey instructions issued by the Austrian Emperor or the archdukes, but not by any other Austrian general. Even more crippling, as it proved, was the dual system of command set up in the Austrian Army of Germany. The Archduke Ferdinand was nominal commander in chief in the Danube theater (until he relinquished control to the Emperor), but Francis had greater faith in the abilities of General Mack and ordered Ferdinand to obey his own chief of staff’s directives. As a direct result, this chaotic muddle led to violent clashes of opinion and personality on several critical occasions in the first phase of the Campaign of 1805; delay, dissension and doubt were the only predictable products of such a system, and fatal they were to prove.

Note: Thousands of men, so I suppose everyone assumed someone else had worked out the dates.

Page 113

before December was out the two largest members of the Third Coalition should have been taught a lesson which it would take more than Pitt’s gold to obliterate from their memories.

Page 137

The corps system had already proved its value in a simplified form during the Marengo campaign of 1800, when the advantages of strategic mobility it conferred were tested for the first time on a reasonably large scale. In 1805, the perfected system was to enable Napoleon to move 226 battalions, 233 squadrons, 161 artillery and sapper companies and a general staff of 1,108 officers, or a grand total of 210,500 men including 29,500 cavalry, together with 396 guns (including 58 twelve-pounders, 146 eight-pounders and 52 canons de six), dragged by 6,430 horses, over a distance of more than 200 miles in the surprisingly short time of thirteen days.

Note: 320km in 13 days. I just cannot imagine how a single soldier marches 25km every single day in alpine territory on dodgy rations. I can’t even manage 25km in a single day with good food and on level ground while not carrying anything. Surely I should be fitter than them, considering the disparity in nutrition?

Page 195

Mack remained as if hypnotized as the main French army swept toward his rear. For several days he was in complete ignorance of the size of the fate bearing down on him, for a combination of the wooded hills of the Black Forest and the eastward running line of the Jura Mountains concealed the magnitude of the French movement, while Murat’s cavalry reserve and the corps’ light cavalry divisions maintained an impenetrable screen between the two armies.

Note: I wonder if the Austrian Emperors faith in Mack was well founded.

Page 208

The length of the daily stages varied between 12 and 40 kilometers according to the requirements of the overall plan, but most units averaged about 30 kilometers a day. The troops formed column between four and six in the morning, and the day’s journey was habitually over by noon, leaving the afternoon free for foraging and the evening and night for rest.

Note: They’re covering 25-30km in 6-8 hours of marching. But then foraging for a few hours takes energy too. And then they wake up at 3am the next day to do it all again.

But I guess these men are lean and fit and young like Ravi Rana and Sachin ji, not so much the rest of us.

Page 228

After crossing the Rhine we were only billeted on the local people twice. The speed of our march made it impossible for supplies to keep pace with us, and so we were often short of bread in spite of all the efforts of our commanding general, Marshal Davout; and when we did receive some it was so bad that it was inedible… . Fortunately, it was the height of the potato season, and they were plentiful in our area. How many times did we ruin the hopes of the villagers! We pillaged from them the fruits of an entire year’s work. However we were, as you might say, forced to do

Note: How did those villagers survive?

Page 238

At this juncture the weather became bitterly cold—rain, sleet and even snow falling continuously—but this did not prevent the army reaching the Plain of Nördlingen by the 6th; the appointed crossing-places over the Danube, Münster and Donauwörth, Neuburg and Ingolstadt, were now within range.

Note: These guys were marching in rain, snow and sleet. Insane.

Page 276

Lastly, in the center of the web sat the spider; Napoleon retained the Guard and Marmont’s corps in the vicinity of Imperial Headquarters at Augsburg to serve as a strategic reserve. This plan allowed for every possible eventuality. Every corps was within 48 hours’ supporting distance of at least two neighbors (with the possible exception of Ney) and could therefore concentrate on any threatened sector; at the same time, the net was spread before General Mack’s army, and whether he rushed into it or stood his ground, there was no easy way of escape left open to him. Napoleon was evidently proud of his achievement, and this is reflected in the Army Bulletin of October 7: “The enemy advanced into the passes of the Black Forest where he planned to position himself and hold up our penetration. He hastily fortified the Iller, Memmingen and Ulm. However, our patrols which are scouring the countryside assure me that he has abandoned his plans, and that he appears to be gravely worried by our moves which are as unexpected as they are novel. This great and vast movement has carried us in only a few days into Bavaria, avoiding the mountains of the Black Forest, the line of parallel rivers running into the Danube valley and the inconvenience of a system of operations always threatened from the flank by the passes of the Tyrol; furthermore, it has placed us several days march in the rear of the enemy who has no time to lose if he is to avoid a complete disaster… .”7 In actual fact, at this particular time General Mack was indulging in an orgy of false optimism. An Austrian agent had reported that he had overheard a lunchtime conversation in a village on the French communications during which rumors of a British invasion at Boulogne were mentioned. This piece of unfounded gossip appealed to the Austrian general and appeared to throw the whole situation on the Danube into a more favorable light: “If the enemy wished to secure Ulm, the right bank was certainly not the side from which to approach it, since the town itself lies entirely on the left bank. If he meant to invest it, then he required to be at least in equal strength on both banks… . But he had withdrawn practically all his strength from the left side … and was approaching by several roads on the south. This gave me the impression of a retreat rather than of an advance; for an army of the Lech, wishing to retire on the Rhine and knowing Ulm to be held by an enemy, would have acted in no other manner. The news brought me by Baron Steinherr, a credible witness, of the conversation he had overheard, coincided so well with the opinions I had already formed on the facts before me, that I allowed myself to accept it as correct.”8 Acting on this fallacious conviction, Mack announced to his men that the French were now in full retreat for the Rhine, moving in three columns, and he ordered each part of his command to prepare flying columns to pursue and harry the enemy. The victim was fairly in…

Page 372

One colorful tale asserts that this officer introduced himself to his conqueror with the words, “Sire, here is the unhappy General Mack,” but de Ségur claims that these words were in fact spoken to a subordinate French officer who did not know the Austrian commander by sight.

Note: Tolstoy used the same words when Mack reaches Kutuzov. But how did Mack escape French hands after surrendering? Was this artistic license by Tolstoy?

Page 457

Napoleon was at Linz on November 9 when he heard of his subordinate’s rash actions, and not surprisingly he was furious; a new blistering reprimand was soon on its way to the recalcitrant Murat: “I cannot approve your manner of march; you go on like a stunned fool, taking not the least notice of my orders. The Russians, instead of covering Vienna, have all retreated over the Danube at Krems. This extraordinary circumstance should have made you realize that you could not act without further instructions.”14

Page 483

At first all went well. On November 12, Murat reached the suburbs of the Austrian capital, lying on the south bank of the Danube. The Austrians had declared Vienna an open city, and in consequence its occupation was unopposed. Five hundred cannon and 100,000 muskets fell into French hands together with a vast quantity of munitions; these windfalls were all the more welcome as the French corps were now far ahead of their supply trains. However, when Murat approached the vital bridge, he found a strong Austrian defense force in possession, and it was evident that demolition preparations were well advanced. Nevertheless, by a superb display of bluff and daring, Murat and Lannes carried the day. As Oudinot’s grenadiers crept towards their objective, the two marshals and their aides strode forward in their resplendent uniforms and calmly walked toward the bridge. The outlying picquet of Austrian hussars could only gape at this spectacle with never a thought of offering resistance. Without an apparent qualm the party made its way onto the bridge, pushing before them a remonstrating Austrian underofficer of artillery, and under the dazed eyes of the troops on the farther bank proceeded to cross over crying, “Armistice! Armistice!” A parley was opened with the commander, Count Auersperg, and the garrison continued to hesitate until a column rushed the bridge while the marshals leaped among the Austrian gunners and by sheer force of personality prevented them from opening fire. Then it was all over; the grenadiers were among the guns pushing the dazed Austrians away from their pieces and the bridge was won without the loss of a life. It was a superb achievement, and when he heard of it, the Emperor readily forgave Murat his earlier mistakes and restored him to a measure of favor.

Page 499

The same day that Bernadotte was at last crossing the Danube, Murat, pushing far ahead with only his cavalry and Oudinot’s grenadiers, clashed with this covering force outside Hollabrunn. The first action was inconclusive, but Murat allowed himself to be talked into accepting a provisional armistice by Kutusov’s emissary, the wily General Winzgerode. Each side agreed to suspend operations and undertook to provide six hours clear notice of any intended renewal of hostilities. When news of this arrangement reached the Emperor in the evening, he was besides himself with rage. “I am lost for words with which to express my discontent,” wrote Napoleon. “You are only the commander of my advance guard and you have no right to conclude an armistice without my order. You have thrown away the advantages of the entire campaign. Break the armistice instantly, and attack the enemy! March! Destroy the Russian army! … The Austrians let themselves be duped over the Vienna bridge, but now you have been fooled by an aide-de-camp of the Tsar!”16 Every phrase rings with heartfelt imperial indignation.

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The advent of this reinforcement stabilized the situation, and Napoleon thereupon sent forward his senior aide-de-camp, General Rapp, with two squadrons of chasseurs of the Guard and one of Mamelukes to give the coup de grâce. The tired Russians were unable to withstand the impact of this new attack, and within ten minutes 500 grenadiers were dead and 200 members of the nobly-born Chevalier Guard—the Tsar’s personal escort—together with their commander, Prince Repnine, were taken prisoner. These captives were led back in triumph to the Emperor who remarked that: “Many fine ladies of St. Petersburg will lament this day.”

Note: I wonder if Tolstoy mentions this

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sauve qui peut

Page 950

The political significance of the events of 1805 was perhaps even more important for the future of Europe over the following decade. The campaign and battle represent the acid test of survival for the First Empire as well as the Grande Armée, its instrument. Only eighteen months had elapsed since the proclamation of the Empire, only one year since the coronation, and in the ruthless conditions of European politics Napoleon’s new-found dignity had to win international acceptance by force of arms if it was to survive the machinations of the vested interests represented by the established crowned heads of the Third Coalition. In actual fact, Napoleon was surprised by the impact of his victory; its true magnitude was only brought home to him on the day after the battle when no less a personage than the Austrian Emperor waited upon him to beg for peace.

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It has been accurately stated that from 1805 Napoleon ceased to be a French and became increasingly a European statesman.

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“The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack.”

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Of course, had Hohenlohe’s plan of the 9th been implemented, Napoleon would have been correct in every particular. On this one occasion, however, the Prussian lack of decision and loose control contributed to mislead the French.

Note: EE sama tactics. Confuse the enemy by confusing yourself

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phases of the Battle of Jena

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The great traditions of Frederick the Great and his justly famed techniques proved fatal to his successors. Complacency led to the rejection of all schemes of modernization, and overconfidence resulted in a complete misappreciation of what was needed to face Napoleon.

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